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Introduction: Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy

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INTRODUCTION

This volume includes essays presented at the conference on *Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy* held at the Universities of Neuchâtel and Bern in October 2005. The authors of this volume share the Humean insight that the ‘sentiments’ have a crucial role to play in elucidating the practice of morality. In a Humean fashion, they warn us against taking an intellectualist view of emotions and reject the rationalist account of morality. In contrast to Hume, however, or at least in contrast to some interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy, some contributors to this volume are optimistic with regard to the weight our emotions and emotional dispositions should play in moral theorising.

In his *What Is Wrong With Reid’s Criticism of Hume on Moral Approbation?* Laurent Jaffro replies to Reid’s objections against Hume’s sentimentalism. Jaffro argues that because Reid uncharitably takes Hume’s moral theory to be a contribution to an analysis of the ordinary meaning of moral judgement, he misses his target. Hume seems to be more concerned with the metaphysical reality of moral judgments; the feelings that underscore them are such that they are suited to explain why we are motivated to act accordingly, but being what they are, i.e. non-intentional states, they are not suitable candidates for representing moral facts. According to Jaffro, this view is entirely compatible with the idea that people usually think that their moral judgments aim at capturing an objective reality. Jaffro goes as far as suggesting that Hume is an early advocate of Mackie’s “error theory” (1977) with regard to the evaluative. This is a strong suggestion since it attributes to Hume the thought that people’s moral assertions are truth-evaluable *and* always false.

It is worth noting here that neither in Hume’s, nor in Reid’s accounts of moral judgments may one be held accountable for one’s emotions or for the actions caused by them. Indeed, both contrast feeling (a kind of sensation with no cognitive content and no intentionality) and judgment sharply; and stress the merely qualitative character of the former. They differ in that Hume thinks that moral evaluation is a matter of non-intentional feelings to the exclusion of the moral judgement that accompanies it; whereas Reid thinks that it is a matter of moral judgement to the exclusion of the non-intentional feelings that are caused by it. In both cases however the role played by emotions in morality remains in a way peripheral (at least in connection with moral theorising and responsibility).

Another theme deriving from Jaffro’s analysis of Hume and Reid is that even if both shared the same notion of feeling, they held very different views about the nature of emotions. For Reid, they are composed of an affective ingredient (a feeling) and a cognitive ingredient (a judgment), where the first is caused by the second. For Hume, instead, an emotion is a complex state not clearly defined. Here Jaffro seems (although not

explicitly) to suggest that Hume defended what has become in contemporary debates a way of conceiving of emotions: an “affective judgement” (see Goldie 2000; Döring forthcoming). What strikes us is how the distinction between Reid and Hume’s conceptions of emotions parallels contemporary debate opposing the “affective judgement view”, and what Peter Goldie labels “add-on views” (according to which an emotion is a judgment to which we add a further separate but not essential component: a feeling).

In her *Responsibility for others’ Emotions* Sophie Rietti argues against the over-intellectualisation of emotions, as developed by the late Roman Stoics and still defended by some contemporary philosophers. For her, emotions can not be understood as evaluative judgements over which we have full voluntary control, a significant consequence of this position being that we are entirely responsible for our own, but not for other people’s, emotions. Rietti offers arguments against the Stoic model, showing how it relies on an unrealistic picture of the human agent conceived as self-sufficient being, and on an unacceptable understanding of emotions as cognitive judgments. Further, on the basis of evidence from sociological studies, she suggests – in opposition to the Stoics – that, to a certain extent, it is possible to manage our own *as well as* others’ emotions, hence being accountable for them. However, she leaves open the question as to how responsibility for others’ emotions should be attributed; as she argues, there is no straightforward answer, for much will depend on issues outside the scope of her paper. Nevertheless, Rietti’s analysis makes it clear that, to a certain extent, the issue of *moral* responsibility can depend on a conception of emotions (cognitive versus affective components of emotion; possibility to regulate our emotions, etc.).

In her *Autonomy and the Emotions*, Christine Tappolet puts into question the rationalist view at a deeper level; she attempts to free the concept of responsibility itself, as well as close notions such as freedom and autonomy, from a non-emotive construal of them. Hence, the problem she focuses on is not – as in Rietti’s project – with the responsibility we have over our emotions or that of other people, but the moral responsibility we have over actions caused by emotions. Her claim is that there are cases where we can act morally and fully autonomously out of emotions even if our emotions incite us to act against our best judgment. Hence, against rationalist accounts, she argues that self-control exercised by the agent’s best rational judgments over his desires and other first-order appetites is not a necessary condition for autonomy. Relying on Frankfurt’s and Shoemaker’s work, Tappolet proposes to cast autonomy as intimately related to who we are, to what we wholeheartedly identify ourselves with, more precisely, to what we care about – where care has to be understood as a set of emotional dispositions. Roughly, an action can be autonomous simply because it has been caused by a care that is central to who we are, independently of whether the agent consciously agrees with it at the stage of action. Therefore, actions caused by emotions, even if they are contrary to our best judgment, might turn out to be autonomous. A consequence of this view is that it becomes possible to act autonomously while acting irrationally. Since actions and choices

are expressions of our character, Tappolet's conception of responsibility differs from Rietti in that it does not involve being capable of acting otherwise.

Like Tappolet, in his *Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception*, Josep Corbí is interested in the notion of character ('who we are') in the context of moral behaviour and decision making. He argues against the view that moral principles are necessary or at least sufficient for moral deliberation. His claim is that appeal to principles does not make sense of everyday deliberation because it does not take into account the agent's character, which is an essential element in deliberating. Corbí's project is to satisfactorily characterise moral deliberation from a first-person perspective. Since it is a particular agent who faces particular situations, the moral deliberation needs to be conditioned by his projects, affections, and commitments. Further, on Corbí's view, in any given morally significant situation, it is the agent's character which is relevant for determining how he ought to respond to these particular situations. In this picture, guilt plays a crucial role as it is an emotion which he takes to be central to the idea of character. Guilt – conceived of as an inner voice shaped through a process of acculturation and personal experiences – has normative significance because it fixes the agent's 'active (but particular) oughts'.

As Tappolet, Corbí endorses a conception of morality in which our emotional dispositions play a central role; although where Tappolet emphasises our capacity for *caring*, Corbí focuses on our capacity for *guilt*. Further, many passages of Corbí's article can be seen as constituting a possible way of expanding on something which is particularly relevant to Rietti's project: how are our emotions shaped through socialisation? Corbí's version, with its Freudian overtones, might not be one that will satisfy Rietti's need, but it indicates one way in which her project can be elaborated. Moreover, Corbí's particularism is congenial to the way Rietti makes ascription of responsibility sensitive to the various ways and circumstances in which we do *in fact* attribute responsibility.

Among our emotions, self-love seems to be especially problematic and yet especially central. It is a vexed question whether self-love is conducive to morality or an obstacle to it. Partly, the answer to this question depends on the status of this emotion. In his *Two Approaches to Self-Love: Hucheson and Butler* Maurer addresses this issue by contrasting Hutcheson's and Butler's account of self-love. Although both philosophers claimed that self-love promotes interest, they did not share the same conception of the notion of interest. As a consequence, they propose two alternative conceptions of self-love. Hutcheson defines self-love as a source of hedonistic motives and desires – and thus not particularly morally recommendable – whereas Butler conceives of it as a kind of love for one's self, a self understood in terms of an individual's real nature – which makes of self-love a part of morality itself. For Butler, self-love is a general affection that aims at the agent's happiness, where happiness has to be understood in a non-hedonistic way (it is not an equivalent to pleasure). More specifically, self-love is said to be *interested* in a teleological, and not in a hedonistic sense, because the agent's interest

is not for the gratification of a present passion or desire but for the realisation of what is good for his nature as a human being. Furthermore, Butler defends the idea that benevolence is a component of human nature. This way of conceiving of the notions of interest and human nature allows Butler to think of self-love as naturally compatible with benevolence: self-love is a general affection that prompts one to follow the particular commands of benevolence. In other words, self-love promotes actions that are for the good of human nature, actions stemming both from benevolent or social affections as well as those stemming from the appetites that allow self-preservation.

This theme echoes some of Tappolet's remarks. As we have seen, she endorses the view that free and autonomous actions out of emotions stem from our central cares, the ones that ground the kind of person we are. Further, as she puts it, our most central cares are those that have developed naturally, those that are not the result of manipulations. Now, Butler's self-love might precisely help us discover our real selves, that is: reveal our strongest cares, our fundamental emotional dispositions (the one that should be realised). Although she does not address this question in her paper, this idea might not please Tappolet since Butler's self-love can only proceed out of an already given "real nature", whereas Tappolet's main source of inspiration is Frankfurt who has developed the idea that we actively form our cares during the course of our lives by means of a first-personal quest for volitional unity (Frankfurt 1999). Further, it is questionable whether this quest for volitional unity is compatible with Butler's conception of real nature since – as explained in Maurer's article – it leaves more room for the cultivation of selfish motives.

The articles contained in this issue challenge a crude rationalist view on two fronts. The first concerns the way to conceive emotions; more precisely, the question of the respective role of the feeling component and the cognitive component in emotions. Rietti refutes the idea that emotions are nothing but judgments entirely subject to our voluntary control; while Jaffro's analysis is infused with a discreet critical tone, urging against taking too much of an intellectualist, as well as an "add-on view", of emotions (see his arguments against Reid). The second front relates to the notion of the morally relevant. Butler's idea of real moral nature revealed by self-love, as well as Corbí's and Tappolet's conviction that our choices and actions stem from guilt (Corbí) and emotional dispositions (Tappolet), can be seen as freeing morality from a too restrictive conception i.e. from a strictly rationalist construal. In particular, Tappolet and Corbí are optimistic with regard to the importance played by our emotions and emotional dispositions in shaping our moral choices and – here also in contrast to Hume – in guiding our moral deliberations; our emotions in general do not only determine what makes it true that we are moral creatures; they are also intentional states, or ground intentional states, which represent the world in evaluative ways that might succeed or not succeed in representing this evaluative world correctly.

Although most contributions to this volume offer cogent arguments against crude forms of rationalism with regard to morality and the emotions, none argue that reasoning and reasons are outside the scope of the morally relevant. For example, irrespectively of the specific views defended by any of our authors, it might still be claimed that emotions are forms of apprehensions of reasons in ways that are still to be elucidated. The merit of the present articles is to provide common ground for further investigation in moral psychology and meta-ethics.

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